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Kosovo is ten years independent Saturday. It has a
lot to be proud of: a functional, more or less democratic state
built in less than twenty years, despite determined opposition from
Serbia and Russia. Most people in Kosovo live the normal lives they
were denied for 20 years prior to independence. They earn
significantly higher wages than in the past, they are safe and
secure in their homes and on the street, they enjoy at least
rudimentary educational opportunities and health care, and they get
to vote every few years for whomever they prefer. That’s the good
news.
There is bad news too. While most of its citizens
are pleased with independence, some are not. There are Serbs who
prefer to be citizens only of Serbia and Albanians who would prefer
to be citizens of a “greater” Albania rather than Kosovo. Kosovo’s
political leadership too often enjoys a standard of living its
salaries alone cannot support. While all vow to make Kosovo a
European Union member, few are prepared to make the difficult
choices required to hasten the day. Cronyism and nepotism too often
determine who gets hired and contracted. Unemployment is the fate of
far too many, even if some of them work in the informal sector.
The statebuilding project is still incomplete.
Despite widespread bilateral recognition, Kosovo is not yet a member
of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. NATO-led forces
guarantee Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The four
Serb-majority northern municipalities are not yet fully integrated
with the rest of the country. International prosecutors and judges
still ensure equity in Kosovo’s courts, including the special
tribunal convened in The Hague to consider “crimes against humanity,
war crimes and other crimes under Kosovo law which allegedly
occurred between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000.” Pristina has
so far failed to demarcate its border with Montenegro and to agree
or demarcate formally its border with Serbia. Perceived official
corruption is at regionally high levels.
Independence, sovereignty and statebuilding are
too often confused, not just in the case of Kosovo. It is entirely
possible to be independent but not fully sovereign. That is also
Taiwan’s fate, since it does not even claim sovereignty but is an
independent state. You can also have a state but not be independent
or sovereign: witness Iraqi Kurdistan. You can also be sovereign and
independent but lack a state: I’d say that is Somalia’s current
fate, more or less. You can even be sovereign but not fully
independent. I’d say EU members are in that category, since they
adhere to a set of rules (the acquis communautaire) over which none
of them have complete authority, having delegated sovereignty to the
European Commission.
For Kosovo, the challenge of the next ten years is
to complete its sovereignty in a way that enables the country to
apply for NATO and EU membership. Anything that detracts from this
goal threatens the welfare and safety of its citizens as well as
regional peace and stability. In practice, this means building
credible security forces that can take over the immediate defense of
its territory, improving Kosovo’s judicial system so that it can
equitably decide cases involving Serbs and other non-Albanian
citizens, agreeing and demarcating borders, integrating the four
northern municipalities, and ending impunity for corrupt and violent
behavior.
I am reasonably confident all this can be done,
but it will require serious commitment on the part of Kosovo’s
citizens to ensure that the leadership moves in the right direction.
Despite the current gloom and doom about the Balkans, Kosovo remains
a singular and extraordinary achievement of international
intervention combined with indigenous determination. It is hard to
sustain such determination over decades, especially when Belgrade
and Moscow are doing everything they can to complicate matters. But
there is no substitute for citizens: they shape the state, determine
what independence can achieve, and make completing sovereignty
possible.
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