Shaun Byrnes, a retired US diplomat who served as
chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Observer Mission in Kosovo in 1998-99,
writes:
Kosovo President Thaçi and Serbian President Vučić
have prepared a draft comprehensive agreement to end the conflict
that has defined Serbia’s relationship with its Albanian citizens
for a century. It is now almost ready for signature but movement on
it is being blocked by Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti’s refusal to lift
tariffs on Serbian imports and a constitutional dispute over who is
in charge of the dialogue with Serbia. The draft reportedly includes
the exchange of territory.
Washington is threatening to withdraw US troops in
retaliation and Thaçi is using escalating US pressure on Kurti to
engineer his government’s collapse. Thaçi claims Kurti’s refusal
dangerously threatens relations with the US.
Kurti has taken the more responsible approach,
unilaterally removing some tariffs on March 15th and offering to
remove the rest on April 1st if Serbia responds constructively. And
he wrote to Secretary of State Pompeo that he will lift the tariffs
and will himself resume the dialogue if Serbia responds
constructively to his phased removal of tariffs.
At the close of an extraordinary session of
Kosovo’s Assembly near midnight on March 11th, the Assembly’s
Speaker proposed ending the tariffs at the same time Thaçi gives up
leading the dialogue. It is not clear what will now happen.
Kosovo leaders need to be reminded that US
friendship is and will remain firm regardless of the disagreement
over the tariffs.
In 2016, the Thaçi and Vučić decided to reject the
EU’s step-by-step approach begun in 2013 in favor of a big,
comprehensive deal. The EU had mediated a series of technical
agreements — university diplomas, license plates, auto insurance,
and the like — that would culminate in a comprehensive agreement
finally “normalizing” their relationship by Serbia’s recognition of
Kosovo’s independence. But few of the technical agreements were
implemented and the dialogue stagnated.
The two presidents met secretly, according to many
accounts, often under the aegis of former EU High Representative for
Foreign and Security Policy Mogherini. By November 2019 these
meetings produced a draft reportedly ready for signature but for a
few details.
The draft included, according to leaks, an
exchange of territory (some parts of Kosovo north of the Ibar river,
and some portions of the Preshevo valley in southern Serbia), an
association of Serbian municipalities with authorities that
reportedly remain to be agreed, extraterritoriality for Serbian
monasteries, and no de jure recognition by Serbia, rather a Serbian
commitment not to block Kosovo’s UN admission.
What Russia will do in the UNSC remains
problematic, despite Putin’s assurances to Vučić and Thaçi in 2018
that Russia will support whatever Serbia and Kosovo agree on.
An exchange of territory (partition) and the
association raised red flags with many diplomats and observers.
Partition risks forced population exchange and even violence. Worse,
it could revive dreams of radical nationalists elsewhere in the
Balkans. A virtually autonomous Serbian association of
municipalities smacks of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska. osovo has enough
dysfunction without adding another ingredient.
In office barely a month, Kurti is under intense
and escalating pressure from the US, and growing pressure from his
coalition partner, to lift the tariffs immediately so dialogue can
resume and the comprehensive agreement completed.
Vučić will not re-engage without Kosovo first
completely lifting the tariffs. Kurti has offered to compromise: to
phase out the tariffs by first ending them on raw materials on March
15th. Apparently 80% of the imports are raw materials so Kurti’s
move goes a long way toward what Serbia, the US and the EU have been
requesting. Furthermore, Kurti offered to remove remaining tariffs
beginning April 1st provided Serbia responds constructively by
removing all non-tariff barriers to trade with Kosovo and halting
its campaign to persuade states recognizing Kosovo to withdraw
recognition.
Washington has rejected the compromise and insists
on all tariffs being removed now and threatened to halt millions of
dollars of financial assistance and subsequently to withdraw US
troops from Kosovo.
However, Vučić will not resume the dialogue until
after Serbian parliamentary elections on April 26th. His public goal
is to have his Progressive Party better its previous decisive
parliamentary victory and he does not want to give radical
nationalist opponents any excuse to accuse him of selling out
Kosovo.
Vučić refused to move forward last week when
pushed by National Security Adviser O’Brien, Special Envoy Grenell
and Trump’s son-in-law Kushner, reiterating he will not reopen the
dialogue until Pristina lifts the tariffs. Even Kushner’s promises
of vast amounts of foreign assistance and investment did not move
Vučić.
In an interview after he returned home, Vučić
declared he would not return to Washington to resume the dialogue
until after the elections and criticized the rush to reach a quick
deal. Vučić has been happy to let Kurti take intense pressure from
the US to resume the dialogue because of his refusal to lift the
tariffs immediately.
So what’s the rush? Kurti will lift most of the
tariffs this weekend and Vučić is in no hurry to resume
negotiations. Furthermore, unlike Washington, Brussels has welcomed
Kurti’s decision to begin phasing out the tariffs and is not putting
heavy public pressure on him to do more. Finally, whence will come
the “hundreds of millions of dollars” of foreign direct investment
and assistance promised by Washington, especially when the US has
not coordinated its initiative with the EU?
It would be wiser to move gradually and build
consensus among political leaders and society for the changes that
the final agreement will produce. Kosovo’s politicians and public
need transparency: there has been none. Thaçi needs to be open about
the contents of the deal so politicians and society can decide on
it, rather than be surprised later by it and its consequences.
Kosovo needs time to develop a consensus on how to proceed with the
dialogue in a democratic manner, and not be pushed into quick
decisions.
In closing the Assembly’s extraordinary March 11th
session on the tariff, Kosovo’s Assembly Speaker, Vjosa Osmani (an
LDK deputy chairman), in a rebuke to Thaçi, called for lifting the
tariffs at the same time he withdraws from the dialogue. Osmani’s
rebuke highlighted Thaçi’s refusal to bow to the constitutional
requirement that it is the government’s prerogative to lead such a
negotiation.
It is Washington and Thaçi that are pressing for a
deal now, and hence escalating pressure on Kurti to lift the
tariffs. President Trump, O’Brien and Grenell are behind the push
for a quick agreement.
Trump is looking for a quick deal to boost his
reelection prospects that are looking dimmer because of the economic
and health crisis spawned by the pandemic coupled with the collapse
of the price of oil and the likelihood that former Vice President
Biden will be the Democratic nominee.
For his part Thaçi sees the deal as an addition to
his legacy but has other more important political considerations. He
would like to bring down the Kurti government to protect himself and
his corrupt cronies from Kurti’s effort to root out pervasive
corruption. Thaçi’s aim is to then forge a new coalition government
composed of the LDK, Kurti’s current coalition partner, and the PDK,
the party Thaçi founded.
Trump’s intervention to take over the dialogue has
given Thaçi the opportunity to do so. He is exploiting threats of US
punitive action as a bludgeon against Kurti and is trying to rally
the LDK and parliamentary opposition to demand the tariffs be lifted
immediately. In public statements this week, Thaçi charged that
Kurti’s actions threatened relations with the US and the “very
future of our state,” an irresponsible charge.
While the LDK’s leader supports Thaçi, for now the
Assembly is not supporting Thaçi and the situation is at stalemate.
It is worth reminding Kosovo leaders that no
comprehensive deal will end Serbia’s hostility to its former
province. Until Serbia acknowledges what it has done in Kosovo under
Milosevic’s rule their relations will neither be normal nor
friendly.
Of more importance, we should remind Kosovo’s
leaders that the US is and will remain a firm friend and that will
not change regardless of what Trump, O’Brien, Grenell, Pompeo and
Kushner may threaten. Kosovo should not be compelled to accept a
consequential agreement with a hostile Serbia its politicians and
public have not seen because of the self-serving motives of one
politician.
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