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These were my remarks to a Columbia University panel on “The Future
of Kosovo” held via Zoom today.
Let me start by saying how much I appreciate David Phillips having
put this panel together. It isn’t easy to wrangle such illustrious
participants, even to a remote meeting. Thank you, David.
My job today is to try to frame the issues in a broader context and
from a Washington perspective.
The key thing to understand is that the Americans have abandoned
their well-established policy on the Balkans and on Kosovo in
particular.
That well-established Balkans policy, part of the broader 1990s
effort to establish “Europe whole and free,” had three pillars:
Protection of Kosovo’s population and sympathy for Kosovo’s
independence aspirations as well as commitment to Bosnian
sovereignty.
Support for liberal democracy throughout the Balkans.
Commitment to acting in tandem with the Europeans, especially with
Germany and the United Kingdom.
My message is just this: things have changed. The Trump
Administration has equivocated on all three of these pillars. Let me
take them in reverse order.
I see no real effort in this Administration to cooperate with
Europe. It has put the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue in the hands of an
American Ambassador in Berlin who has offended the German government
and spoken against the EU. Professional diplomats who know the
Balkans well are now sidelined.
Washington now favors border changes to accommodate ethnic
differences, even though they would signify inability to treat all
people equally, which is the liberal democratic ideal. Regrettably,
Europe’s High Representative Borell has gone along, as did his
predecessor.
Finally, it is all too clear that Belgrade, not Sarajevo or
Pristina, is today Washington’s preferred Balkan partner.
These changes signify a major shift in U.S. policy. How did it
happen?
The Trump Administration is ethnic nationalist. It sympathizes when
it hears from Serbia’s government and lobbyists that Serbs should
govern Serbs and Albanians should govern Albanians. President Trump
is trying to appeal almost exclusively to whites and to limit
minority voting. Why wouldn’t it listen to Balkan ethnic
nationalists?
Moreover, Republicans know that Serb Americans in a potential swing
state like Ohio are an electoral bonanza far more valuable than the
Albanian Americans in New York, which is a lock for the Democrats.
The Trump Administration has failed so far in all its major foreign
policy initiatives. Ric Grenell is trying to give the President a
good headline before November 3. All the better if it is one that
kills two Clinton achievements, Bosnia and Kosovo.
So U.S. government support for Kosovo’s aspirations has weakened:
you see it in the cut off of funding and the threat to withdraw U.S.
troops. These are irresponsible moves.
You see the weakening of U.S. support also in the lack of concern in
the Administration about the impact of a Kosovo land swap on the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
So, you may ask, what is to be done? I’ll leave it to the panel
participants to address the issues. My views on some of them are
well-known: I support reciprocity between Pristina and Belgrade, I
oppose partition, and I think a deal on tariffs and non-tariff
barriers is doable.
Three further options for Kosovo need to be considered. I’ll call
them the 3Ds:
Diversify
Deter
Delay
Let me take each of these in turn.
How can Kosovo diversify its support beyond the U.S.? Germany first
and foremost: Kosovo needs to ensure that opposition to land swaps
is sustained not only in the Chancellor’s office but also in the
Bundestag. Berlin must continue to make it clear that it will not
accept changes in borders to accommodate ethnic differences. It
needs to reign in Borrell.
Switzerland, the UK, and Ukraine are other countries that have their
own powerful reasons for opposing land swaps. Even for
non-recognizing Spain, the idea should be anathema.
How can Kosovo deter land swaps? The key here is reciprocity.
In all future discussions, Kosovo should seek the equivalent of
whatever Serbia seeks: the same acreage, the same powers for an
Albanian municipal association in Serbia as for a Serb one in
Kosovo, the same representation in Belgrade for Albanians that
Serbia has in Pristina, equivalent removal of non-tariff barriers in
exchange for removal of tariffs.
And above all, mutual recognition and exchange of
ambassadorial-level representatives, with an unequivocal and
verifiable commitment not to block Kosovo entry into the UN or other
international organizations.
Sadly, deterrence is unlikely to work perfectly, because of the
strong American lean towards Belgrade. Delay is also vital.
Vucic has made it clear he will wait until after the Serbian
election and government formation in late June for any deal with
Pristina. The Trump Administration will then press for land swaps
before the fall. So July and August, when Europe is asleep, may be
crucial months.
A Kosovo Constitutional Court decision to disallow formation of a
new government without new elections could cause a further, welcome
delay.
By October 1, Kosovo will be safe from partition if it hasn’t been
done yet.
What, you will ask, about the American elections?
If I were a Kosovo patriot, I wouldn’t bank on a Biden victory in
November, but I would hope for one. Joe Biden knows the Balkans well
and would return to the well-established policy of support for
Kosovo and Bosnia and cooperation with Europe. A Biden
Administration should close the door on land swaps, loudly.
If Trump wins a second term, the electoral pressure for a quick deal
will fade but I would still expect Grenell and others to pursue land
swaps, if only to feather their nests for their next jobs.
And the President himself will feel completely uninhibited: expect
wild moves, not only in the Balkans.
So the next few months are vital for Kosovo’s future. I am hoping to
hear from the other panelists how they think its statehood,
territorial integrity, and sovereignty can be ensured.
P.S. Here is the full video of the Columbia event:
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