I -
Introduction
1. Overview
Status of human rights in the year 2000 resulted from
many negative developments which marked the past decade, or legacy
thereof. The nationalistic project was defeated, but that defeat is yet
to be accepted. The aforementioned is best mirrored in nationalism which
persists, although it has lost its mailed fist. New authorities have
only 'retouched' nationalism and are yet to make a clean break with
respect to the previous policy. Such a break would indicate
discontinuity with the past regime. Neglect and implosion of society,
collapse and de-professionalization of institutions, absence of
independent judiciary, politicisation of police, social and economic
ills-are circumstances essentially determining a general picture of
human rights.
After bombardment and filing of war crimes indictments
against Slobodan Milosevic and his collaborators, the regime, after a
short-lived consolidation primarily made possible by inappropriate
actions of the very opposition parties, entered a genuine agony of bare
survival. After exhausting all possibilities for the post-NATO
intervention recovery, the regime opted for a non-selective repression
in all spheres of public life, notably in the judiciary, educational
system and the media. That was the last stage of devastation of
institutions. Added to that the regime in the early 2000 aggressively
opened a front against Montenegro, and through constant tension in the
republic held the war option permanently open there.
After several months of shilly-shallying the
opposition managed on 10 January 2000, under pressure of the
international community, to sign the Agreement on Joint Actions. Since
then, having banded together an 18-party coalition, the opposition
started gradually winning the confidence of citizens of Serbia, notably
with respect to the issue of removal of Slobodan Milosevic. In fact the
opposition did not endeavour to offer any other program than the one of
removal of the regime. In the post-NATO campaign period citizens for the
first time reacted from the positions of their bare survival. Mood of
masses had changed significantly. A broad-based resistance to the regime
was mounted, but motivations thereof varied. Some blamed the regime for
the collapse of the country, some feared a new war, and some deplored
the war defeat. Economic situation in the country however played a
crucial role in citizens resolve to be rid of Milosevic.
Regime responded in a panicky way to each new problem.
Its responses always ended in a new form of repression. Crackdowns on
the media were frequent. They were either shut down or compelled by
judicial rulings to pay exorbitant fines. Members of the student
movement "Otpor" were persecuted and frequently detained. Faced with a
total debacle of its policy and a mounting internal resistance, the
Socialist Party of Serbia at its Fourth Congress opted for the policy of
continual repression, brutal harassment of all its political opponents
and self-isolation in the international scene.
In such a repressive mood the regime also laid waste
to the judiciary, key pillar of any legal state. Although in former
Yugoslavia the judiciary has never been independent, notably in
political cases, it nonetheless achieved enviable standards of
professionalism and independence in many segments of its work. Constant
purges de-professionalized and simultaneously discredited the judicial
system. A major blow to the system was the early June dismissal of a
large number of impartial judges.
Such an oppressive conduct of the regime helped
homogenise the opposition, notably regarding the issue of removal of
authorities. In the course of 2000 a series of unsolved murders and
disappearances continued. Abduction and disappearance of Ivan Stambolic,
former President of Serbia, was the most salient political case. Several
months after his abduction there were still no indications as to his
whereabouts and -fate. Precarious situation was moreover compounded by
the fact that the new authorities had not taken adequate measures to
boost relevant investigation and eventual solving of this case. Mafia
circles increasingly resorted to abductions as a method of money
extortion. After a recent kidnapping of a son of a celebrity couple
Fahreta Jahic and Slobodan Zivojinovic, the whole family moved to the
US. Murder of judge Nebojsa Simeunovic, who investigated many unsolved
murders cases, notably the one of Pavle Bulatovic, Defence Secretary,
indicates that at play were diverse methods of showdown. Assassinations
of Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan (President of the Serbian Unity Party),
Pavle Bulatovic (Federal Defence Secretary), Zika Petrovic (Director of
the Yugoslav Airlines), and Bosko Perosevic (President of the Executive
Council of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina) are yet to be solved.
The regime's decision to call early local and federal
elections was obviously an expression of its misjudgement of the popular
mood. In line with that decision Slobodan Milosevic swiftly staged a
"constitutional coup" by amending two key provisions of the FRY
Constitution, which severely affected Montenegro and derogated election
rights of Serbia. Montenegro stayed away from the federal elections, for
its participation would have been tantamount to acceptance of its
abruptly changed, or in fact, worsened position in the federal state.
Consequently the government was cobbled together with representatives of
the Socialist Popular Party (SPP) headed by Momir Bulatovic, former ally
of Slobodan Milosevic, instead with representatives of the ruling
Montenegrin coalition. It bears stressing that amendments to the FRY
Constitution were just one more confirmation of "institutional and
extra-constitutional" disintegration of the FRY (the same method was
applied in former Yugoslavia). But this method had a boomerang effect on
Serbia proper.
Non-participation of the official Montenegro in the
local and federal elections, its reserved stance on the "new Serbia" and
insistence on secession from Yugoslavia caused much displeasure among
the Serb politicians. One of the first post-election statements of
Vojislav Kostunica was that" secession is out of question." In his
subsequent statements he was however more observant of his declared
pro-legitimacy position, albeit that position remained a hard-line one.
In his talks with Milo DJukanovic on 25 December 2000 Vojislav Kostunica
warned that the "Montenegrin Constitution expressly prescribes a
two-third parliamentary majority regarding the issue of change of the
state status," but also stressed that "any talks on re-arrangement of
state, without participation of the federal authorities, cannot be
conducted." He also cautioned against "the grave consequences of the
Federation split on the whole area of the FRY."
September and December elections were an expression of
a deep frustration and dissatisfaction of citizens of Serbia on the one
hand, and an upshot of a genuine agreement between the DOS and the
closest collaborators of Slobodan Milosevic (from the military, and
police ranks) in the period between 25 September and 5 October 2000, on
the other hand. Choice of Vojislav Kostunica as the DOS presidential
nominee resulted from a consensus reached between some circles of the
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Serbian Orthodox Church and
the Yugoslav Army. He was widely promoted as "Mr. Clean," while most DOS
leaders were tainted with corruption allegations. Kostunica was also
hyped as a personality maintaining the Serb national interest "in a
democratic way." Developments related to elections and 5 October
"revolution" indicated that in 25 September-5 October period a new
"alliance of elites" was forged. That alliance secured a non-violent
ouster of Milosevic. Lengthy interview given by Zoran DJindjic to weekly
Blic News in the late 2000 sheds light on some aspects of those
developments. He admits that his key contact was "Legija, Head of the
Red Berets, a unit created to represent the last line of Milosevic's
defence. Red Berets are 1,200-strong unit trained for urban warfare,
which can smoothly crush the resistance of 20,000 civilians. They are
equipped with choppers, armoured vehicles, state-of- the- art weapons
and are in fact a cross between the police and army. I was tasked with
establishing contacts with them. "Legija" pledged that "Red Berets"
would side with DOS, likewise their colleagues, all the police units
previously deployed in Kosovo, whereas other units, non-combat units,
which were not deployed in Kosovo, were said to be ill-equipped to carry
out that task." In crucial moments Kostunica met with Nebojsa Pavkovic,
Head of Joint Chiefs of Staff and Slobodan Milosevic. Topics of their
talks still have not been disclosed. First cracks in the alliance
between Zoran DJindjic, President of Democratic Party and the DOS
nominee for the Prime Minister of Serbia, appeared in the immediate
post-revolution period. Namely they disagreed over treatment of the SPS
cadres. Kostunica was convinced that people could change and become
better persons. Dusan Mihajlovic, President of New Democracy, cautioned
him against such reasoning: "We have not elected you our Patriarch, but
our decision-making President."
Interregnum between the two election rounds,
characterised by division of power, threw the country anew into
disarray. It soon became evident that DOS had no political concept
whatsoever. Moreover it started emulating the former regime. A near
coup-like take-over of some public services and companies of vital
importance by the DOS leaders was justified by the need to protect vital
state functions, property and compromising documentation on machinations
of former regime. Numerous "crisis headquarters" swiftly cobbled
together in many institutions and companies Serbia-wide, were a
brainchild of the DOS member- parties. Although the underlying political
connotation of such moves was clear (destabilisation of the republican
authorities and 'extortion' of early elections at the republican level),
even understandable (although not legal), the manner of appointment of
new management and administrative bodies was debatable. As in most cases
DOS leaders were guided by party and personal interests, they tended to
disregard professional and moral criteria. In numerous cases dismissals
of old management were initiated by the very employees, freed from fear
and resolved to single-handedly "dispense justice." Such a DOS conduct
was most evident at the local level.
DOS used a wide support (which was extended to the
opposition to effect the ouster of Milosevic) to place under its control
all segments of society. This had a negative impact on trade unions,
without a firm footing in the society, and weighted down by incompetent
and unprofessional cadres. DOS holds sway both over the Independent
Trade Union (which used to protect the regime's interest) and other free
trade-unions. This could prove to be fatal for trade unions, for they
could lose credibility and the very sense of their existence. Moreover
it could help legalise all possible abuses in the process of
transformation of companies and institutions, at the expense of
employees' interests, which should be the primary focus of trade unions
activities.
Total collapse of the system and social and economic
ills still threaten to throw the country into a total anarchy in months
to come. The fact that Milosevic was overthrown is not in itself a
guarantee that fundamental changes of the system shall be effected..
Legacy of the previous regime objectively does not leave much room for
positive expectations Added to that potential of new authorities is not
very promising. Transition shall be weighted down by corruption and
criminality. Top leadership of former authorities partook in many
criminal activities and shady deals. But as those circles helped and
smoothed over the take-over of power, it is difficult to expect that new
authorities would be willing to "purge" them.
One should also underscore the key role of
international factors. They rendered ample financial and logistical
backing to the domestic political, civil and NGO opposition. In the
immediate post-bombardment period a series of initiatives aimed at
training the opposition activists and organising resistance to the
regime, was launched, notably the Segedin one. Under the auspices of the
Stability Pact in the course of the year a series of round-tables,
conferences, workshops, and training courses were organised. The most
positive change in the wake of September elections was the end of the
FRY political isolation, its immediate re-admission to many
international institutions, for example, the IMF, UN, OSCE, the
Stability Pact for South East Europe. The chaos in which the country had
been plunged would have been even more dire and dangerous without
enormous financial support rendered to the new authorities. The basic
goal of the international community is to prevent collapse of Serbia and
to consolidate the entire region. Hence in the past three months no
demands regarding the criteria and standards to be met by the FRY were
voiced or placed.
DOS victory simultaneously helped "normalise" Serb
nationalism; relativised recent past and within that context confirmed
the negative stand of the Serb society on the Hague Tribunal. Systematic
glossing over the truth and orchestration of collective amnesia, hyping
of illegitimacy of NATO intervention and of the "Serb victims" gives
little hope that the past events would be faced and examined and that
the issue of the war-time responsibility would be tackled. Due to
inability to tackle the essential problems and an objective identity
crisis of society, the abstract "Serbhood" regains importance. Serbs are
depicted as victims anew and myths are once again employed. Milan
Protic, Mayor of Belgrade, stresses that "new Serbhood should rely on
anti-communism, Orthodox religion and monarchy."
A very critical line is taken on the Hague Tribunal.
As regards Slobodan Milosevic not a single opposition leaders is ready
to back the hand-over of Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal. They all
maintain that that the Serb people should first try him for election
rigging and criminalization of society. Such a tack can backlash, for it
facilitates Milosevic's political comeback. Positions on Milosevic and
the Hague Tribunal shall be genuine indicators of readiness of new
authorities to effect fundamental changes.
Society and administration steeped in corruption are a
main obstacle to transition. Ouster of Slobodan Milosevic has not
immediately resulted in the removal of his close associates, who are
extremely wealthy, have excellent contacts and joint interests with
criminalized segments of society, good connections with the underworld,
managers of the grey economy zone, and those wielding the levers of
repression apparatus.
Judiciary, university and media bore the brunt of
Milosevic's repression. Media were financially exhausted, journalistic
professionalism was degraded, and but key problems of the society are
still not tackled in the right way. After Milosevic's ouster the media
scene underwent a transformation which is yet to crystallise the media
role in the new social context. The pro-government media overnight
switched sides, and non-government media are yet to distance themselves
from the new authorities. Restructuring of the media scene is in the
offing, under thoroughly new conditions of reduced foreign donations.
Added to that the foreign capital-if any-shall be invested in
commercially viable media ventures. OSCE and other international
organisations shall insist on freedom of information as one of the main
prerequisites of democratisation.
Serbia ranks among the most corrupt states in the
world. It is steeped in the state-boosted corruption, which over the
years 'contaminated' the whole society. Corruption and war crimes are
key issues and main challenges for the new authorities. Moral recovery
of the society and the very process of its re-integration in the
international community shall depend on the authorities' ability to
tackle the two aforementioned issues. Resolution of those issues shall
be required prior to distribution of foreign financial
assistance/support.
Serbia practically has no institutions or a financial
basis for ensuring minimal rights, notably the social and economic ones.
Added to that citizens in the forthcoming period shall focus on their
every day survival. Consequently the emphasis shall be on social and
economic rights. Highly pauperised and devastated Serbian society has no
preconditions for democratisation and full observance of human rights.
Hence the following strings should be attached to the FRY's admission to
the Council of Europe: establishment of independent judiciary,
professional police and professional media. All three requirements are
objectively difficult to meet. They exact time and political will, but
minimum standards must be met.
2. Elections
The political makeover in Serbia opened up all sorts
of possibilities and new fields of action. However even three months
after elections the political scene of Serbia is still in a genuine
turmoil. Crystallization of society shall not be possible without an
in-depth probe into the past activities of former authorities and
institutions, The new authorities have not made a clean break with the
previous regime nor have they made moves in that direction.
Slobodan Milosevic made a blunder by calling snap
elections. He obviously misjudged both the popular mood and influence of
international factors on developments in the country. Added to that
there is no real insight into behind-the-scenes developments, which
according to scant information, where masterminded by Milosevic's
coterie. The NATO air strikes, indictment against Milosevic and the
Western countries decision, notably the US one, to finally remove
Slobodan Milosevic from the political scene, coincided with
dissatisfaction of citizens and consensus on the necessity for changes
within the Serbian elite.
The regime's attempt to rig the September elections
and contest Kostunica's victory caused massive demonstrations and
general strike in Serbia. On 2 October 2000 DOS appealed the decision of
the Federal Election Commission. Two days later the Constitutional Court
at its 4 October session refused to pass a ruling on the DOS appeal and
relegated responsibility to the Federal Election Commission. The 5
October turnaround confirmed Kostunica's victory, which was thereafter
recognized by the FRY Constitutional Court.
After 5 October, thanks to favorable coverage of their
role, the police and the Yugoslav Army saw their popularity soar with
the general public. Slogan "the police sided with people" essentially
implied that the most influential police and military circles cooperated
with the DOS. Also physical and logistical support of broad masses, and
notably of the "Otpor" movement played a crucial role in making possible
a turnaround.
"Otpor"'s role in pre-election developments is still
not clear, but judging by large foreign assistance it has received, it
must have been an important one. According to Washington Post, Americans
-resolved to bring democracy to Serbia- were attracted to the students'
movement. Namely Americans assessed that "Otpor"s horizontal structure
would thwart the regime to target it precisely. Added to that the
movement's resolve to endure all detentions and continual police
harassment helped its members pluck up enough courage for a long
struggle. "Otpor" also had a clear plan to remove Milosevic and
transform Serbia into a "normal" European country. It also encouraged
many parents and young people to vote. All this strengthened the US
resolve to bankroll the movement. Paul Mac Carthy from the
Washington-based National Heritage Foundation says: "So since August
1999 large amounts of dollars were siphoned into "Otpor...the movement
was on the receiving end of the largest part of about $ 3 million spent
by the Foundation in Serbia since September 1998. Meetings were held in
Podgorica, Budapest, etc." Slobodan Homen from "Otpor" says: "We enjoyed
a very large financial backing of Western NGOs and some Western
governmental organizations."
"We want Milosevic to step down, to leave Serbia and
end up in the Hague, the seat of the International War Crimes Tribunal,"
stated Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State. Former US Ambassador
to Croatia, William Montgomery, said: "Madeleine Albright was personally
interested in Milosevic, he was her top priority."
Nobody knows the exact amount of money invested to
that end. USAID stated that only in 2000 it allocated $ 25 million to
Serbia's opposition. Top leadership of "Otpor" hinted that they have
received sizeable covert assistance. Before fall 2000, "Otpor" evolved
into a well-organized movement, bolstered up by the US assistance worth
several million dollars
In addition to financial assistance, "Otpor" was also
taught how to implement a well-elaborated strategy. US author Gene Sharp
writes: "Naked force of the regime was aimed at non-violent
activists...but it backlashed, sowing disaccord among the regime's ranks
and bolstering up the popular and even the regime's loyalists support
for "Otpor". Disenchanted parts of the military and police sided with
the opposition long before the federal parliament building went up in
smoke and Milosevic decided to step down. "Strategists of disobedience
know it is difficult to crack-up dictatorship if the police, bureaucracy
and military continue to back a dictatorial regime and obediently carry
out orders of their superiors. Hence it is important to attach great
priority to strategies aimed at weakening loyalties of pro-dictator
forces."
The political scene was affected by 5 October
developments, public speech acquired new forms. All the blame has been
put squarely on Milosevic's shoulders and he has been turned into a
scapegoat. New detractors, former members of the SPS, Milorad Vucelic
and Zoran Lilic, blamed the party for all the past developments. Public
at large is primarily interested in the issues of crony privatization,
origins or background of wealth illegally amassed in the hands of few
individuals and corruption. Statements of DOS leaders imply that courts
of law shall resolve all irregularities. But courts of law in fact can
only solve violations of legal provisions and not 'amend' the social
processes.
The post-5 October period was marked by a genuine
vacuum in functioning of the republican authorities. DOS, despite the
popular backing, instead of taking-over complete power at the republican
level, opted for the formation of an interim government through
nominations of co-ministers. The SPS co-ministers were also named. This
halted changes in all structures of republican government, notably in
the judiciary and police.
The financial elite of Socialists profited most from
the election outcome. It created a cult around Kostunica's legalism, and
turned him into a new leader. They think that he will help them legalize
and preserve their amassed wealth, once a legal state is created.. Only
the issue of corruption of Milosevic and his closest allies is tackled,
in a bid to dispense a kind of justice. Daily "Blic" for example ran a
feature on enormous wealth of Milosevic and his inner circle. Judging by
unwillingness of the new authorities to make a clean break with the old
structures, one can expect only a few spectacular trials, which shall
give a stamp of legitimacy to the new authorities.
A part of the general public and some Western
governments (notably the US Administration), expect that "Otpor" shall
"spawn a new generation of leaders, making up a new elite in the Serb
political scene," as the US Ambassador to Serbia, William Montgomery,
has put it. "That would be a hefty interest rate on the US investments
into the movement," stated the Ambassador. However "Otpor" is yet to
criticize some moves of President Kostunica, notably those related to
non-cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, relations with Montenegro and
his position on the top brass and upper echelons of the Serbian police.
December parliamentary elections in Serbia confirmed
the DOS victory at all political levels. Of a total of 250 parliamentary
seats, DOS won 176, the SPS-37, the Serbian Radical Party-23 and the
Serbian Unity Party-14. Personal popularity of President Vojislav
Kostunica ensured 45 seats for his DPS. DP has also won 45 seats,
although it was a marginal party in terms of its size. The Civic
Alliance of Serbia, Social Democracy and New Democracy each won 9 seats,
New Serbia has won 8 seats and the Christian Democrats Party of Serbia-8
seats. Democratic Center, Social Democratic Union, the Vojvodina
Coalition and Vojvodina Reformists won 4 seats each. Democratic Party of
Sandzak of Rasim Ljajic won 2 seats, while the SRM, Coalition Sumadija
and Association of Independent and Free Trade Union won 1 seat each.
Such a motley structure of 18-party coalition was
immediately reflected in the policy pursued in the post-election period
(since 5 October). Two blocks soon emerged: the nationalistic block
rallied around Kostunica, backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the
Serbian Academy of Sciences and part of the top brass and police,
structures of former regime, while the block rallied around Zoran
DJindjic, bent on articulating a pro-European policy enjoys the backing
of part of the nouveau rich elite. But regarding key issues there are no
big differences between the two blocks. Kostunica's block still insists
on the Greater Serbia issue and denies the Hague Tribunal legitimacy,
while DJindjic shows a more flexible stance on the latter.
Weaknesses of the new authorities, for example, lack
of professionalism and experience in managing the affairs of the state,
soon emerged. Milan Protic, for example had jockeyed for the position of
Mayor of Belgrade, but soon after his appointment opted for the
ambassadorial post in the US, as "Serb people shall benefit more from my
foreign assignment."
Massive assistance rendered to Serbia after
installation of the new authorities, prevented the collapse of the
country, and enabled consolidation of the new ruling set. However that
assistance also helped improve the image of new authorities, who in fact
lack a genuine potential to effect fundamental changes. For example
recent pay rises based on foreign donations thwarted social protests.
But once donations stop flowing in, strikes and demonstrations are
likely to be staged.
HCHRS |
