International complicity in the Bosnian genocide
Sylvie Mutton
(A Statemnet at the Seventh Biennial Meeting of
the International Association of Genocide Scholars, Sarajevo, July 2007
)
Ladies and gentlemen,
Having very little time to speak, I will be direct;
I'll just say clearly what I believe about Western complicity with the
genocide that occurred in Bosnia in the 1990s. But it is disturbing for
me to do so here, when among all the scholars here present there are
also victims, survivors; it's as if I were appropriating the right to
tell you your own story, the story of your suffering; a story you know
much too well. I hope you will forgive me.
"Reacting to genocide before it's too late."
Unfortunately, there seems to be no such thing in history, either before
1948 nor after the word genocide was invented. But if they refer to the
'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the crime of genocide',
leaders of UN member countries have an international legal obligation to
react, interfere, intervene, as soon as one of them is suffering or
about to suffer an act of genocide. The UN Charter proposes a wide range
of actions against the aggressor in Chapters VI and VII, including the
use of force. This, of course, is the reason why world leaders are so
reluctant to call a crime a crime, and a genocide by its name. That's
what happened among the permanent members of the UN Security Council
during the Bosniac genocide, from 1992 to 1995: The United States wished
not to get involved, the 'zero dead' option meaning there would be no
men on the ground. Russia clearly supported Serbia, its Slavic sister
and a trade-bound country. And Great Britain and France, more
secretively but quite efficiently, were supporting Milosevic's so-called
'politik.'
International consensus after the crime would be a
childish cover-up: "We didn't know; we couldn't have known." The reality
was denied : the planned aggression of Milosevic's army against the
Bosniac civilians was called a "civil war." There was neither an
aggressor nor an aggressed population, but warring parties, belligerents
attacking each other because of ancient hatreds, etc. ... The aggressor
was painted as a victim and the killings, the massacres as plain
collateral damage. François Mitterrand and his ministers (as Roland
Dumas and Hubert Védrine) ; John Major and his (as Rifkind and Hurd)
-all of them repeated those same lies. The words chosen were part of the
plan; in fact, they repeated Belgrade's propaganda. But they were so
erroneous, so unrealistic compared to what was actually happening on the
ground that they revealed later not only the truth that those in charge
wanted so very much to hide, but also their personal commitment, if not
their complicity. The corruption scandal linking some Western
politicians to Milosevic's regime was first denounced in Great Britain
by Ed Vulliamy and, later, by Carol Hodge; and in the United States by
Roy Gutman. As for the French politicians, all the proof has not yet
been compiled, but we have quite a lot of clues.
The main purpose of all those lies and denials was, of
course, to stay away from the dangerous word 'genocide.' Had the crime
been recognized as such as soon as Bosnia became part of the UN on May
22, 1992, members of the organization would have been obliged to
intervene using military force. But most likely, after the first lies
and compromises, it was already too late to react from the leaders'
point of view.
The words chosen for this consensual camouflage prove
a clear intention to hide the truth. Because there is no doubt that they
all knew what was planned out and then achieved; they all know, from the
services and agents, from the intercepts and aircrafts, from the drones
and satellite shots, but also through Karadzic's public speeches. Some
of the trials at the ICTY have yielded crucial evidence. They knew as
early as May 1991 about arms and killers flooding into Bosnia, in the
first chapter of the planned aggression on the towns and villages. The
Bosnian intercepts between Milosevic and his Bosno Serbs accomplices
talking about this organization are now public. They were certainly not
meant to be heard only by the Bosnian presidency. They were a desperate
cry for help.
The Western leaders knew as early as January 1992
about the tanks up on the hills surrounding Sarajevo, ready to attack
the besieged city. As Roy Gutman revealed, certain CIA agents informed
the US Administration that those tanks could be entirely destroyed by
NATO forces within a day or two. But at that time, the United States
wanted to avoid any involvement in Milosevic's wars - despite the
suffering such an intervention would have prevented.
This medieval siege (plus mortars and snipers) was
allowed by the leaders of the so-called civilized world, as proven by
the former French president François Mitterrand: his apparently friendly
visit to Sarajevo on June 28, 1992, with Bernard Kouchner, the current
French Foreign Affairs Minister, confirmed international treason.
As Roy Gutman realized while writing his first
articles on the concentration-extermination camps in Northern and
Eastern Bosnia in early August 1992, the CIA had obviously known of
their existence since very early April. As for François Mitterrand's
being told about them by Alija Izetbegovic during his visit, he remained
silent for more than a month until the camps were denounced by the
media. Did the Western leaders conclude, at the time, that it was too
late to react? Or did they simply choose to let Milosevic and his
Bosnian Serb accomplices achieve their goal?
We should remember the Nazi camps. When discovered by
shocked soldiers in 1945, four years after the Holocaust started and
after the extermination of six million Jews, the leaders of the Allied
countries pretended to be astonished. In 2005, 60 years later, the
actual leaders of those countries admitted that their predecessors had
been aware of the existence of those camps-thanks to airplane shots.
Nevertheless, for four years, they chose not to react.
During the Bosniac genocide, not only was there no
will to interfere, but there was a clear will to support the aggressor.
All the UN resolutions that were proposed and voted in by the Security
Council had been, most of the time, promoted by the French and the
British. All those resolutions prove their support. The first ones for
example, as the arms embargo, offered the military power to Serbia,
while denying Bosnia the slightest legal right to self-defense as
mentioned in the Charter.
Thanks to Diego Arria, the former UN ambassador from
Venezuela, and both his testimonies at the ICTY, we have precise clues
about the responsibilities of the Russian, British, and French on the
Security Council, with withholding information, disappearance of crucial
documents, etc. In April 1993, back from a UN mission in Srebrenica he
had promoted in April 1993 (the only one of its kind), Diego Arria also
denounced to the press, the 'slow-motion genocide' he had witnessed in
the enclave.
In 1995, Western leaders wanted more than ever to pull
out of Bosnia and find an agreement with Milosevic. It had to happen.
Public pressure for peace was strong and impatient. The negotiations
started in late May, in Belgrade, between Robert Frasure, one of Richard
Holbrooke's team, and Milosevic. That's what one can conclude from what
Carl Bildt told me when answering one of my questions: 'Republika Srpska
had been dealt at the end of May, in Belgrade." Republika Srpska
negotiated and accepted by Milosevic meant no Muslim enclaves left on
that territory. In exchange, Milosevic would accept a cease fire, the
recognition of the Republic of BH and the same surface of territory as
the sacrificed enclaves, regained by force within the early Serb
conquests in Western Bosnia -but no more : the Croato Muslim forces
helped by some Americans were told to stop before Banja Luka they had at
hand.
Lets also remember Holbrooke's words when interviewed
for Hayat Television in November 2005: "I was under initial instructions
to sacrifice Srebenica, Goradze and Zepa... and I thought that was
wrong." When asked if the sacrifice of the enclaves meant only the
territories or both the territories and their populations, his answer by
email was clear; "Both." I also asked him who had given him his
instructions. The answer was 'Tony Lake,' meaning Number 3 at the White
House. Later, when interviewed by American journalists about that
statement which was published in a French magazine, Holbrooke would
pretend he meant only Goradze but neither Srebenica nor Zepa. But that's
impossible: the context of his answer is Srebenica, and during this
ten-minute interview, Goradze is not even mentioned anywhere else!
The fall of Srebenica was planned out. In the first
days of July, most of those in charge left for a trip or on holidays,
and wouldn't get back to their offices before the enclave was in the
hands of Mladic's forces. Obviously, they didn't want to be there, and
to have to react. I'm mentioning, of course, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi
Annan, Yasushi Akashi, but also Ruppert Smith, among others...
But once the so-called UN 'security zone' had fallen,
the UN should at least have taken care of the population, which
obviously needed to be evacuated. Instead of doing so, Boutros-Ghali, as
usual obeying the British and French, refused, on July 11th, around 6.30
P.M., to let the transfer be organized using UN vehicles.
While interviewing Alain Juppé, the former French
Prime Minister in May 1995, I asked him if he knew of Karadzic's
instructions: "Take the enclaves and destroy the Muslims." He repeated
the sentence, confirming that all Western politicians concerned by the
conflict were aware of the Serb leader objectives. And when I asked
Juppé what he meant by the word "destroy," he answered me, while
obviously not being aware of the real meaning of his sentence: "We knew
the Serbs would make no prisoners." Now, no one needed Intelligence to
know that the men and boys were being separated from the rest of the
population. Mladic himself had said it to the crowd in Potocari in front
of a camera: "Women and children first." They all knew right from the
beginning that the systematic slaughter had begun. They needed neither
satellites, nor U2 images, and they wouldn't even ask for the pictures
to be treated. They knew through their agents, their intercepts, through
the desperate phone calls from the Bosnian Presidency or ministry of
Foreign Affairs. But they pretended not to know, and wouldn't even try
helping the column of men fleeing out of the forest.. None of them
promoted a negotiation with Milosevic. They simply looked the other
way...
To avoid being accused of complicity in an ethnic
cleansing, they chose to let Mladic's forces do the job, despite the
terrible risk to the sacrificed population. They preferred becoming
accomplices in this ultimate chapter of the Bosniac genocide. as long as
they could deny it. That is why they have never wanted Karadzic or
Mladic to be arrested and tried, as their trial would in part reveal the
negotiations and compromises of the so-called International community
with the criminals - especially of the 5 Permanents of the Security
Council.
Looking at the example of the Bosniac genocide, we see
how the "too late to react" may, in fact, start very early for
politicians - as early as the first negotiations, compromises and lies.
The gap between awareness and complicity is dangerously narrow. The
shameful ICJ judged that Serbia had violated the Convention of genocide
by not preventing it in Srebenica. But you can only try to prevent it if
you are being informed of its preparation. And this is precisely where
the complicity starts, for Serbia, of course (political complicity with
the RS being a euphemism), but also for all informed foreign
governments.
This is when the counter-power of the media becomes so
powerful, while provoking indignation in the public opinions. All of
us-writers, journalists, observers, members of the civil society, we
must remain aware; we must fight for the values and principles that
politicians are used to putting aside so easily. We must keep on
denouncing the previous genocides, as this conference allows us to do;
we must have the truth emerge and be admitted by all as such. Because
denial always opens the door to the potential for repeating such a
crime. While anticipating the next genocide, we must continue denouncing
the process in order, perhaps, to avoid it. Reacting to the next
genocide must start now; it can never be too early. |