The Balkan Region
THE INABILITY FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION
By Vladimir Gligorov
During her recent visit to Serbia German Chancellor Angela Merkel said
what everyone knew at least since the European Union has established EULEX in Kosovo,
which - exactly what its name says - has the duty to impose rule of law. What everyone
also knows - at least since then - is that EULEX and parallel structures in Kosovo North,
both dependent and independent from Belgrade authorities - cannot exist side by side. All
that Ms. Merkel said was something like "the king is naked." And all at once
seemed to have changed.
This means not that Serbia's application for EU candidacy will be turned
down. Nor it means that negotiations on harmonization of Serbia's legal system with the
one of EU will not begin. Finally, this means not that Serbia cannot further progress
towards European integrations before dismantling the parallel institutions. In other
words, Serbian authorities only have to take upon themselves to dismantle these structures
because EU cannot possibly have a member-state in conflict with it in a disputable
territory. The German Chancellor said the problem should better be solved sooner than
later - but that was not an ultimatum or homework. Everybody is aware that Serbia-Kosovo
relations must normalize and then formalize, and that the rule of law in Kosovo North
should be established within the legal system of Kosovo and EU. Dedication to this goal
and a progress towards it would at least help Serbia avoid unnecessary risks in the
process of its movement towards EU membership. The conflicts over border crossing stations
in Kosovo North sufficiently demonstrated the reality of such risks.
More important than Ms. Merkel's spelling out the common knowledge is
that fact that her visit to Serbia was focused on one topic only - the issue of security
that preconditions the achievement of all other political and economic objectives. Few are
the countries having the highest German official in visit but no economic cooperation on
the agenda. In planning this visit Serbian officials have obviously looked forward to
getting Germany's support for the actual government's pro-European policy. What they
disregarded was that the Germany Chancellor would not give her country's support just like
that. Many other statesmen in visit to Serbia and routinely expressing their support to
its "European course" just take upon themselves to give their vote to any
decision by EU bodies when the time for decision comes. Germany is in charge of the agenda
and implementation of EU decisions - politically, administratively and, of course,
financially. Therefore Germany's support cannot be just an act of courtesy, meaning you
cannot get it without clarifying its implications. If Belgrade governmental circles and
those close to them were genuinely surprised by Germany's straightforwardness, that means
that the people in charge of foreign policy and the policy of European integration know
nothing.
Ever worse, not a word was spoken about the economic cooperation between
the two countries. That means that the government and officials in charge of economic
matters have either not prepared themselves for the meeting or not participated in its
planning at all. Germany is the biggest exported of capital and a major importer of
industrial and other products deriving from its investments. Given that the economic
policy is directed towards the growth based on exports, industrialization and the growth
in exports need foreign investment the more so since domestic savings are limited. German
investment would be most precious in this context. As economic topics were not on the
agenda at all, one can only conclude that security issues - not economic - predominate
Germany's preoccupation with Serbia.
Things stand the same with the Balkans as a whole and as such indicate
the prospects for the Balkans. The region in which security is still a crucial issue is
now restricted to Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina (probably not entirely). The
biggest part of the Balkans faces economic problems with inherent political consequences.
But security is not a major risk facing businessmen and politicians alike. The manner in
which Serbian authorities and Serbia's voters - now with the forthcoming elections - will
react to these new challenges is still uncertain. No doubt that the German Chancellor's
intervention will influence the election campaign and the alternatives to be offered to
voters.
The public and voters in the entire Balkans are facing the choices
imposed on them by the financial crisis and influenced by the changes within EU
institutions and in the balance of power within and beyond the Union alike. Unlike the
part of the Balkans still coping with basic constitutional problems and, hence, security
risks, most Balkan countries have to face up serious structural changes - and all of them
together need to work towards a much better regional cooperation. This is the more so
important since the development in the Balkans depends on three crucial characteristics:
open or latent security risks, uncompetitiveness and mutual distrust.
Latent or open conflicts cannot but affect democratization processes.
Dictatorships in the Balkans were usual, whereas democracies were mostly attained through
integration into EU. The integration in itself has a stabilizing effect because rules out
possible animosities among countries and, therefore, sources of militarization and
autocratic regimes. Besides, democracy and the rule of law - regardless of their
shortcomings in some countries - precondition membership of EU. In return, this stabilizes
democracy in the long run - at least as long as EU itself is in place.
In Balkan territories and states that have either not joined EU or are
just about to start moving towards it, disputes over territories and sovereignty over some
territory maintain animosities and reliance on force and, as such, can destabilize
democratic institutions - if any or emerging. That is why in some circumstances democracy
is almost impossible - as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina - authoritarian regime
flourishes - like in Republika Srpska - parliamentary system is instable - as it is in
Serbia - and consequent democracy hindered - like in Kosovo. Therefore, speaking generally
at least, as long as security is the problem number one in a region, stable democracies
there will be questionable, while possibilities for restored autocracies bigger.
Economies in the entire Balkans - except for Turkey that is not entirely
a Balkan country - are uncompetitive. The whole region hinges on foreign funds, relatively
limited production and export of labor force. A considerable part of population in the
growing number of Balkan countries depends on the money sent by relatives working abroad.
The prospects for changes are meager. Radical reforms are needed to change deep-rooted
institutions and attitudes. This particularly implies quite different attitudes towards
entrepreneurship, labor market and functioning of the public sector. At this point hardly
anything indicates a change in the political in favor of these reforms. This decade will
hardly witness a conversion. Developments in EU member-states and Croatia - to accede in
mid-2003 - will considerably depend on economic developments in EU as a whole. But having
itself to cope with consequences of the financial crisis and the upcoming institutional
reconsideration, EU cannot be the much needed driving force of development in the Balkans.
A word or two on Balkan Euro-skepticism. How much sense it makes? For
instance, should Euro zone break up and, consequently, ties within EU become looser,
Europe would again find itself in the situation when everything depended on the relations
between great powers. Everything would change for small countries - they would lose a
forum enabling them to stand up for their interests and form coalitions that assist them
in attaining these interests. Euro-skeptics in the Balkans disregard the fact that EU is
above all a mechanism that restrains the power of big states, those that in the past, when
not in war, used to settle their disputes to the detriment of smaller countries.
Finally, inability for regional cooperation is the basic problem in the
Balkans. This is best exemplified in the case of ex-Yugoslavia. Apart from providing a
reasonable frame for coexistence of different peoples in its territory, it was the best
means of cooperation in the process of European integration. Since such a political frame
was "tight" to everyone, it's not a surprise that peoples in dispute cannot
cooperate at regional level after Yugoslavia's disintegration. One can hardly expect,
therefore, regional cooperation to flourish against today's politically divided and
economically devastated background.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel's visit only refreshed everyone's
memory. The shock caused by her statements best illustrates the uncertainty of the
Balkan's future. |